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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/987,005	11/13/2001	Yong-Bin Eym	P66201US1	6362

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EXAMINER
SISSON, BRADLEY L

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
1634	

DATE MAILED: 07/01/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary	Application No.	Applicant(s)	
	09/987,005	EYM, YONG-BIN	
	Examiner Bradley L. Sisson	Art Unit 1634	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on _____.
 2a) This action is **FINAL**. 2b) This action is non-final.
 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.
Disposition of Claims
 4) Claim(s) 1-5 is/are pending in the application.
 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
 5) Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
 6) Claim(s) 1-5 is/are rejected.
 7) Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
 8) Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
 10) The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.
 Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
 11) The proposed drawing correction filed on _____ is: a) approved b) disapproved by the Examiner.
 If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
 12) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120

13) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
 a) All b) Some * c) None of:
 1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
 * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
 14) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).
 a) The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
 15) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

Attachment(s)

1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) 4) Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). _____.
 2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) 5) Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) _____. 6) Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION

Location of Application

1. The location of the subject application has changed. The subject application is now located in Workgroup 1630, Art Unit 1634, and has been docketed to Primary Examiner Bradley L. Sisson.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

2. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Upon review of the specification, that portion spanning from page 11, line 9, to page 12, line 10, appears to be the only part of the disclosure directed to the invention of claims 1-4. None of the examples are directed to the claimed method and nowhere has the specification been found to reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the genus of objects encompassed by claim 5. The identified portion of the disclosure is considered, at best, to indicate an approach others may take in developing the claimed method and arriving at the claimed product of Claim 5. Such generalities, however, do not reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the

invention. While the specification directs attention to Korean Laid-open publication No. 99-78599, such is without effect as the document has not been incorporated by reference and even if the specification were to contain a statement that the document had been incorporated by reference, the specification does not identify what portion(s) of the document are being incorporated. As set forth in *Advanced Display Systems Inc. v. Kent State University* (Fed. Cir. 2000) 54 USPQ2d at 1679:

Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material from various documents into a host document--a patent or printed publication in an anticipation determination--by citing such material in a manner that makes it clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein. *See General Elec. Co. v. Brenner*, 407 F.2d 1258, 1261-62, 159 USPQ 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968); *In re Lund*, 376 F.2d 982, 989, 153 USPQ 625, 631 (CCPA 1967). **To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.** *See In re Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 674, 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (providing that incorporation by reference requires a statement "clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found"); *In re Saunders*, 444 F.2d 599, 602-02, 170 USPQ 213, 216-17 (CPA 1971) (reasoning that a rejection or anticipation is appropriate only if one reference "expressly incorporates a particular part" of another reference); *National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.*, 274 F.2d 224, 230, 123 USPQ 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1959) (requiring a specific reference to material in an earlier application in order to have that material considered a part of a later application); *cf. Lund*, 376 F.2d at 989, 153 USPQ at 631 (holding that **a one sentence reference to an abandoned application is not sufficient to incorporate from the abandoned application into a new application**). (Emphasis added.)

3. Claim 5, drawn to objects of manufacture that are to comprise DNA prepared in accordance with the method of claim 1, has not been found to be adequately supported by the disclosure in such a way as to reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of said objects. The object is to comprise DNA that has been painted or coated onto the surface of an image of bands that have been separated. The size of gels frequently used in such separation is of the order of many centimeters in length, yet the specification identifies objects such as cards,

shoes, and photos (page 12, first full paragraph). The disclosure does not describe in sufficiently clear terms how such a large image is to be condensed so as to permit it being offset-printed on any of these items and how DNA is reproducibly applied through the use of a squeegee (page 12, line 1).

4. For purposes of examination, claim 5 has been interpreted as encompassing DNA from any individual in the world as well as any life form thereof and any synthetic DNA. Support for this interpretation is based on the claim found at page 12 of the disclosure:

Therefore, the DNA may be used to confirm a person's identity; i. e. the DNA contained in an object prepared according to a method of the present invention may be compared with the DNA obtained from a person to be identified, thereby to determine, if required, whether the person is the donor or, is genetically related to the donor.

A review of the disclosure fails to find where the DNA from any individual has been bound to the surface of any such article through offset printing. While applicant may assert that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan to produce such an invention, such is not dispositive of the requirements for an adequate written description. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43 USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

Assuming *arguendo*, that the specification did provide such an example, a point that the Office does not concede, such a disclosure would not be supportive of an adequate written description of the claimed genus. In support of this position attention is directed to the decision in *In re Shokal*, 113 USPQ 283 (CCPA 1957) wherein is stated:

It appears to be well settled that a single species can rarely, if ever, afford sufficient support for a generic claim. In re Soll, 25 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1309, 97 F.2d 623, 38 USPQ 189; In re Wahlfors et al., 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 867, 117 F.2d 270, 48 USPQ 397. The decisions do not however fix any definite number of species which will establish completion of a generic invention and it seems evident therefrom that such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of particular cases. Thus, in the case of small genus such as the halogens, consisting of four species, a reduction to practice of three, or perhaps even two, might serve to complete the generic invention, while in the case of a genus comprising hundreds of species, a considerably larger number of reductions to practice would probably be necessary.

We are of the opinion that a genus containing such a large number of species cannot properly be identified by the mere recitation or reduction to practice of four or five of them. As was pointed out by the examiner, four species might be held to support a genus, if such genus is disclosed in clear language; but where those species must be relied on not only to illustrate the genus but to define what it is, the situation is otherwise.

5. For the reasons of record, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 1-5 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, as not being adequately described by the disclosure.

6. Claims 1-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. As set forth above, the specification does not reasonably suggest that applicant was in possession of the claimed method or in possession of the claimed objects. Clearly, one cannot enable the use of that which they do not possess.

While the specification does provide some general guidance at pages 11-12, *supra*, such general guidance does not rise to the level of an enabling disclosure. It is noted with particularity that the disclosure does not set forth reaction conditions and starting materials to be used in performance of the claimed method. The situation at hand is analogous to that in *Genentech v. Novo Nordisk A/S* 42 USPQ2d 1001. As set forth in the decision of the Court:

“ ‘[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.’ *In re Wright* 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *see also Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharms. Co.*, 927 F. 2d 1200, 1212, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1026 (Fed Cir. 1991); *In re Fisher*, 427 F. 2d 833, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970) (‘[T]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.’).

“Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable. *See Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148 USPQ 689, 696 (1966) (starting, in context of the utility requirement, that ‘a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.’) Tossing out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclosure. While every aspect of a generic claim certainly need not have been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified in the specification, reasonable detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to understand and carry out the invention.

“It is true . . . that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art. *See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skill in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point, a direction for further research. (Emphasis added)

7. It is noted with particularity that the DNA being applied to the surface of the "object" need not bear any correlation to the image or that the DNA being so applied is even known. The specification does not teach a reproducible method by which the immobilized DNA is used in any method. Additionally, the claimed object does not require that any material for absorbing, immobilizing, preserving and protecting the DNA be used. Accordingly, the claim has been interpreted as encompassing naked DNA being applied to an exposed surface. The specification is silent as to how such an object is to be used in any process.

8. While it is not a requirement under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, that each embodiment be described in such full, clear and concise terms so as to enable the invention, the level of disclosure required varies inversely with the predictability of the art. As noted in *In re Fisher* 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA, 1970):

In cases involving predictable factors, such as that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.

9. As noted above, the claimed method and object of manufacture clearly encompass both chemical reactions and tie the presence of genetic material with specified physiological processes, including life forms. The lack of specific starting materials and reaction conditions unfairly shifts the burden of enablement from applicant to the public. The level of experimentation required for the public to practice the full scope f the invention is undue. Accordingly, the claims are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, as not being enabled by the disclosure.

Conclusion

10. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (703) 308-3978. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

11. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gary Benzion can be reached on (703) 308-1119. The fax phone numbers for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned are (703) 872-9306 for regular communications and (703) 872-9307 for After Final communications.

12. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.



Bradley L. Sisson
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1634

BLS
June 30, 2003